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Abstract: Why do producers often accept parallel trade in some markets such as 
automobiles, clothing, toys and consumer electronics? This paper identifies two new 
factors, viz., market stealing and union-wage cutting, which may make parallel trading 
beneficial to a manufacturer. Specifically, (i) under perfectly competitive labour markets in 
both the home and foreign countries, parallel trade may help a manufacturer to steal market 
shares from competitors, if it is more cost efficient or sells in more markets than 
competitors; and (ii) in a unionized labour market, parallel trade may help by lowering the 
unionized wage. These benefits of parallel trade disappear when such factors are removed. 
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A common concern of policy makers is to protect the property rights of innovators from 
unauthorized production. While there exist strict measures (e.g., patent protection) to guard 
the interest of the innovators, a closely related issue, namely, parallel trade (or grey 
markets), which allows unauthorized sale of a product, is often allowed.
1 Many countries 
such as Australia, New Zealand and Singapore have liberalized restrictions on parallel 
trade and the European Union is also very active in reducing restrictions on internal 
parallel trade.
2 As noted in Scherer (1994), the first major competition policy enforcement 
in the EC is related to an attempted dealership territoriality within the EC. Malueg and 
Schwartz (1994) confirm that policies worldwide generally support parallel trade.
3 
While the conventional belief is that parallel trade hurts manufacturers by creating 
competition, anecdotal evidence suggests that parallel trade may benefit them at least in 
some markets. For example, “ … some manufacturers, while publicly opposed to gray 
market sales of their products, privately do little to inhibit their flow and in some instances 
even go so far as to encourage these transactions” (Lipner, 1990, p. 4). A report prepared 
for the EU commission (NERA, 1999, p. 11) states that “[s]ome parallel trade, however, 
seems to be beneficial to the trademark owner.” In the North American automobile market, 
retailers selling new automobiles must sign a contract with manufacturers forbidding them 
to re-sell these cars in other countries. However, over 200,000 vehicles intended for the 
Canadian market were resold south of the border in 2001 (increased from 16,000 in 1996 
(Automotive News, 2002)), yet the no-parallel-trade clause was not enforced, thus 
imposing no penalties on the retailers. 
                                                           
1 As mentioned in Maskus (2000), parallel trade occurs when a good protected by a patent, copyright, or trademark, 
having been legally purchased in one country, is exported to another country without the authorization of the local owner 
of the intellectual property rights in the importing country. 
2 Richardson (2002) documents that restrictions on parallel trade originating outside the EU are quite permissible. 
3 In the US, parallel trade was US$7-10 billions in the mid-1980s (Cespedes et al., 1988), and rose up to US$20 billion 
more recently (Computer Reseller News, 2001). In Europe, the volume of parallel trade varies from 5% of sales (on 
appliances, motorcars and consumer electronics) to almost 15% (on musical recordings, cosmetics and perfumes) 
(NERA, 1999). The House of Commons (1999) report shows that the volume of parallel trade in the UK motorcycle 
market is around 25% of sales.    
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In the present paper, we provide two strategic reasons for profitable parallel 
trading: parallel trade may benefit a manufacturer either by stealing markets from the 
competitors or by reducing the unionized wage faced by the manufacturer. The model 
explains why some manufacturers often accept parallel trade in markets where product 
market competition is visible, such as in automobile, cloths, toys and consumer electronics, 
and when the factor market is imperfect, such as in some European and U.S. markets, and 
also justifies policy markers’ relaxed approach towards parallel trade. 
First, section 2 examines the effect of market stealing, leaving the factor (labour) 
market perfectly competitive. We use a framework of two manufacturers one of whom 
serves both domestic and foreign markets and the other serves only the domestic market. 
We find that the former firm’s profit is higher under parallel trading of its product. 
Moreover, if both firms serve both markets, parallel trading can benefit the firm that is 
more cost efficient. 
Second, in Section 3 we consider labour market imperfection by assuming a 
unionized home-country labour market. We demonstrate that parallel trade from a foreign 
country to the home country reduces the unionized wage. Even though parallel trade 
increases competition in the home market, this wage-reducing effect can dominate the 
competition effect, making parallel trading beneficial to the manufacturer.  
Previous literature has generally argued that parallel trade reduces profits of the 
manufacturers (Malueg and Schwartz, 1994, Richardson, 2002, Maskus and Chen, 2004 
and Hur and Riyanto, 2006, etc.). There are also works which show that manufacturers can 
gain from parallel trade under certain conditions, such as if a country chooses both the 
tariff level and whether or not to allow parallel trade (Knox and Richardson, 2002), or if 
the product of the parallel trader and that of the manufacturer are differentiated (Ahmadi 
and Yang, 2000). More recently, Raff and Schmitt (2007) explain that, in the presence of 
demand uncertainty, parallel trade may benefit the manufacturers if the following four  
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conditions are met: the retailers must order the product before the realization of demand, it 
is costly to maintain inventories, the states of demand are different across markets, and 
different states of demand need to affect the quantity demanded rather than the consumers’ 
willingness to pay for the products. 
In contrast, the present paper provides a new rationale for profitable parallel 
trading, even if the government is not an active agent, the products of the manufacturer and 
the parallel trader are homogeneous and there is no uncertainty that creates the motives for 
risk diversification through parallel trade. Certainly these are important factors that can 
cause parallel trading to arise. However, our focus is on the importance of market stealing 
and union-wage cutting, which has been ignored in the literature.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the effects 
of product market competition with a perfectly competitive labour market. Section 3 looks 
into the case of a labour union. Finally, section 4 concludes. 
 
2. The effects of product market competition 
Consider a manufacturer, firm 1, which sells its product in two countries, A and B. In 
country A, firm 1 sells directly to the consumers. In country B, firm 1 sells through an 
independent exclusive distributor, I. We assume that firm 1 offers I a contract in the form 
of (w, T), where w is the wholesale price and T is a transfer payment (franchise fee) paid 
up-front from I to firm 1.  So far, the model is in line with the vertical pricing model of 
Maskus and Chen (2004).  
Now we introduce market competition, by assuming that in country A, the product 
market is a duopoly with firms 1 and 2 competing with homogeneous products. Both firms 
have constant marginal costs, which is normalized to zero for simplicity. To demonstrate 
our result in the simplest way, we start our analysis with the assumption that firm 1 sells in  
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both countries A and B, while firm 2 sells only in country A, which might be caused by 
resource constraints. This assumption will be relaxed in Subsection 2.3 to see how the 
analysis is affected if both firms serve both countries. We assume that the inverse market 
demand function in each country is P = 1 – q.  
We consider the following sequence of moves. At stage 1, firm 1 gives a take-it-or-
leave-it contract (w, T) to firm I, which either accepts or rejects it. We assume that I 
accepts the offer if it earns at least its reservation payoff, which is normalized to zero. If I 
accepts the contract, at stage 2, firms 1, 2 and I choose their outputs simultaneously, and 
the respective profits are realized. If I does not accept the contract, at stage 2, there is no 
sale in country B, and firms 1 and 2 choose their outputs simultaneously and their profits 
are realized. We solve the game by backward induction. 
 
2.1. No parallel trade  
First, consider the case of no parallel trade. If I accepts firm 1’s contract, given w and T, 




12 1 (1 )
A
AA A B I q
Max q q q wq T    ,                                                 (1a) 
 
2
12 2 (1 )
A
AA A q
Max q q q  ,                               (1b) 
  (1 )
BI
BI BI q
Max q w q T   ,                               (1c) 
where the first subscript denotes the country and the second one the firm. 
  Standard calculations show that the equilibrium outputs are 
  12 1/3 AA qq   and   (1 )/ 2 BI qw   .                  (2) 
The profits of firms 1, 2 and I are then  
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  11 1 1/9 (1 )/2
np
AB ww T    ,                                                
  2 1/9
np   ,                                                      
 
2 (1 ) / 4
np
I wT   .                                                    
Since firm 1 gives a take-it-or-leave-it offer to I, the equilibrium transfer payment is 
2 (1 ) / 4
np Tw  . Firm 1 then determines the wholesale price w by maximizing 
 
2  1/9+w(1-w)/2+(1-w) /4
w Max ,                    (3) 
which gives the equilibrium wholesale price as  0
np w  . The reason for this result is easy 
to understand. Since I sells the product in country B as a monopolist, firm 1 finds no reason 
to distort I’s output choice. Hence, firm 1 charges the wholesale price that creates the 
maximum profit in I, and it also extracts this profit through the transfer payment. 
Therefore, under no parallel trade, the equilibrium offer made by firm 1 to I is 
(,) ( 0 ,  1 / 4 ) wT  , and this offer will be accepted by I. 
  The net equilibrium profits of firms 1, 2 and I are respectively 
  1 13/36
np   ,   2 1/9
np   ,  and  0
np
I   .                                      (4) 
  
2.2. Parallel trade 
Next consider the game under parallel trade. As in Maskus and Chen (2004), Li and 
Maskus (2006) and many others, in this situation, I not only sells the product in country A, 
but also in country B if it is profitable. Hence, while offering the contract to I, firm 1 needs 
to internalize this possibility. 
 If  I accepts firm 1’s contract, given w and T, firms 1, 2 and I maximize the 
following expressions simultaneously to determine their outputs: 
 
1
12 1 (1 ) ( )
A
AAA I A B I A I q
Max q q q q w q q T     ,                         (5a) 
 
2
12 2 (1 )
A
AAA I A q
Max q q q q  ,                              (5b)  
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  12 ,
(1 ) (1 )
BI AI
BI BI A A AI qq
Max q w q q q q w T     .                         (5c) 
Standard calculations give the equilibrium outputs as 
  12 (1 ) / 4 AA qq w   ,    (1 )/ 2 BI qw      and    (1 3 )/ 4 AI qw   .            (6) 
The profits of firms 1, 2 and I are 
 
2
11 1 (1 ) /16 (3 5 ) / 4
p
AB ww w T      ,                                             
 
2
2 (1 ) /16
p w   ,                                                     
 
22 (1 ) / 4 (1 3 ) /16
p
I ww T    .                                                 
The equilibrium transfer payment is obtained as 
22 (1 ) / 4 (1 3 ) /16
p Tw w   . Firm 1 
then determines the wholesale price w by maximizing 
 
22 2 (1+w) /16 (3 5 )/ 4 (1 ) / 4 (1 3 ) /16
w Max w w w w     .                        (7) 
The equilibrium wholesale price is obtained as  0
p w  .  
It is interesting to note that even if firm 1 faces competition from I in country A, it 
does not charge a positive wholesale price to I. The intuition can be understood as follows. 
On one hand, I is a monopolist seller in country B. On the other hand, under parallel trade, 
not only firm 1 but also firm 2 face competition from I. These combined effects induce 
firm 1 to keep I’s marginal cost (which is the wholesale price) low.  
The equilibrium offer made by firm 1 to I is then ( , ) (0, 5/16) wT  , which will 
be accepted. The net equilibrium profits of firms 1, 2 and I are respectively 
  1 3/8
p   ,   2 1/16
p   ,  and   0
p
I   .                                     (8) 
Now we are in position to state two propositions: 
 
Proposition 1: The equilibrium outputs of firms 1 and 2 are lower with parallel trade than 
without.   
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Proof: The outputs of firms 1 and 2 are  12 1/3
np np
AA qq  under no parallel trade, which are 
greater than the counterparts under parallel trade,   12 1/4
pp
AA qq . ■ 
 
  Proposition 1 shows that parallel trade reduces the outputs of both firms 1 and 2. 
 
Proposition 2: Parallel trade increases the profit of firm 1 and reduces that of firm 2. 
Proof: The result follows immediately from (4) and (8). ■ 
 
  The reason for Proposition 2 is as follows. Parallel trade enables I to steal business 
from both firms 1 and 2 in country A. However, since firm 1 can use the transfer payment 
to extract profit from firm I while firm 2 cannot, parallel trade in effect helps firm 1 to gain 
from firm 2’s business loss to firm I, making firm 1 better off and firm 2 worse off.  
  The above analysis is based on homogenous products. However, the implications of 
product differentiation are straightforward as follows. If firms 1 and 2 produce imperfect 
substitutes, it will reduce the intensity of competition between them. As a result, the 
business stealing effects under parallel trade will be weakened. At the extreme situation, if 
the products of firms 1 and 2 are isolated, parallel trade will not affect the market share and 
the profit of firm 2, since the product of the parallel trader (which is actually the product of 
firm 1) is also isolated from firm 2’s product. Then parallel trade increases competition 
only for firm 1. Hence, Proposition 2 holds if the products of firms 1 and 2 are not too 
much differentiated.   
 
2.3. Competition in both markets 
In this subsection we extend the model to cover competition in both markets. We find that 
profit raising parallel trade can still occur if the firms differ in marginal costs.  
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Consider that both firms 1 and 2 serve both markets A and B. Each firm sells 
directly to the consumers in country A, but firms 1 and 2 sell their products through 
independent exclusive distributors  1 I  and  2 I   respectively in country B.
4 However,  we 
assume that the marginal cost of production is c for firm 2, while it has been normalized to 
zero for firm 1. Also,  12/53 c  , which is sufficient to ensure that all equilibrium outputs 
are positive.  We consider the same timeline as in the previous section. 
 
2.3.1. No parallel trade  
If firms 1 and 2 give the offers  11 (,) wT  and  22 (,) wT  to  1 I  and  2 I   and the offers are 




12 1 1 1 1 (1 )
A
AA A B I q
Max q q q wq T    ,                                       (9a) 
 
2
12 22 2 2 (1 ) ( )
A
AA A B I q
Max q q c q w c q T    ,                         (9b) 
 
1
12 1 1 1 (1 )
BI
BI BI BI q
Max q q w q T   ,                             (9c) 
2
12 2 2 2 (1 )
BI
BI BI BI q
Max q q w q T   .                            (9d) 
Standard calculations show that the equilibrium outputs are  1 (1 ) / 3 A qc  , 
2 (1 2 ) / 3 A qc  ,  11 2 (1 2 ) / 3 BI qw w    and  22 1 (1 2 ) / 3 BI qw w   .        
The profits of firms 1, 2,   1 I  and  2 I  are then 
 
2
11 1 1 1 2 1 (1 ) / 9 (1 2 ) / 3
np
AB cw w w T       ,                                                   
2
22 2 2 2 1 2 (1 2 ) / 9 ( )(1 2 ) / 3
np
AB cw c w w T      ,      
2
11 2 1 (1 2 ) / 9
np
I ww T    ,                                                           
 
2
22 1 2 (1 2 ) / 9
np
I ww T    .                                                           
                                                           
4 In a different context, Ziss (1997) considers the effects of exporting by the manufacturers through distributors on 
strategic trade policies.   
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Since firms 1 and 2 give take-it-or-leave-it offers to respectively  1 I  and  2 I , the equilibrium 
transfer payments are 
2
11 2 (1 2 ) / 9
np Tw w    and 
2
22 1 (1 2 ) / 9
np Tw w   . Firms 1 and 2 




11 2 1 2  (1+c) /9+w (1-2w +w )/3+(1-2w +w ) /9




22 1 2 1  (1-2c) /9+(w -c)(1-2w +w )/3+(1-2w +w ) /9
w Max ,                    (10b) 












 . Hence, 
both firms 1 and 2 charge wholesale prices which are lower than their marginal costs of 
production. It is clear that the business stealing motive in a Cournot oligopoly is the reason 
for this type of pricing strategies. Firms 1 and 2 want to reduce the marginal costs of  1 I  
and  2 I  respectively to make them more competitive in country B, and then use the transfer 
payment to extract the gain from higher competitiveness. This logic is in line with the 
incentives for strategic separation as in Vickers (1985) and Ziss (1997).  
Since  12/53 c  , we obtain positive equilibrium outputs, evaluated at the 
equilibrium wholesale prices. Under no parallel trade, the equilibrium offers made by firms 
1 and 2 to  1 I  and  2 I  are  respectively 
2
11 ( , ) ( (1 2 ) / 5, 4(1 2 ) /25)
np np wT c c     and 
2
22 ( , ) ( (1 8 ) / 5, 4(1 3 ) /25)
np np wT c c    , and these offers will be accepted by  1 I  and  2 I . 
  The net equilibrium profits of firms 1, 2  1 I  and  2 I  are respectively 
     
2
1 (43 122 97 )/ 225
np cc    , 
2
2 (43 208 262 )/ 225
np cc     and  12 0
np np






2.3.2. Parallel trade 
Next consider the game under parallel trade. Then  1 I  and  2 I  not only sell in country A, but 
also in country B if that is profitable. Hence, when offering the contracts to  1 I  and  2 I , 
firms 1 and 2 need to internalize this possibility. 
 If  1 I  and  2 I   accept the contracts of firms 1 and 2, the equilibrium outputs are 
determined by maximizing the following expressions: 
 
1
1 2 1 2 111 1 1 (1 ) ( )
A
A A AI AI A BI AI q
Max q q q q q w q q T      ,                               (12a) 
 
2
12 1 2 22 2 22 (1 ) ( )( )
A
AAA IA I A B I A I q
Max q q q q c q w c q q T       ,                  (12b) 
 
11
1 211 1 2 1 211 1 ,
(1 ) (1 )
BI AI
BI BI BI A A AI AI AI qq
Max q q w q q q q q w q T      ,              (12c) 
22
12 2 2 1 212 2 2 2 ,
(1 ) (1 )
BI AI
BI BI BI A A AI AI AI qq
Ma x q q wq q q q q wq T      .          (12d) 
Standard calculations yield the equilibrium outputs as  11 2 (1 ) / 5 A qc w w    , 
21 2 (1 4 ) / 5 A qc w w    ,  11 2 (1 2 ) / 3 BI qw w   ,  22 1 (1 2 ) / 3 BI qw w   , 
11 2 (1 4 ) / 5 AI qc w w     and  22 1 (1 4 ) / 5 AI qc w w    . 
The profits of firms 1, 2,   1 I  and  2 I  are then 
2
11 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 ( 1 ) /25 [( 1 2 )/3 ( 1 4 )/5]
p
AB cw w w w w c w w T            , 
2
22 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 / (1 4 ) / 25 ( )[(1 2 ) / 3 (1 4 ) 5]
AB
p cw w w c w w c w w T              , 
22
111 1 2 1 2 1 (1 2 ) / 9 (1 4 ) / 25
p
IB IA I ww c ww T         ,                   
22
222 2 1 2 1 2 (1 2 ) / 9 (1 4 ) / 25
p
IB IA I ww cww T         .                 
The equilibrium transfer payments are 
22
11 2 1 2 (1 2 ) / 9 (1 4 ) / 25
p Tw w c w w       
and 
22
22 1 2 1 (1 2 ) / 9 (1 4 ) / 25
p Tw w c w w      . The equilibrium wholesale prices can be 
found as  1 (34 77 )/188
p wc    and  2 (34 299 )/188
p wc   . It is clear that the wholesale  
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prices are higher under parallel trade than under no parallel trade. The total equilibrium 
profits of firms 1, 2  1 I  and  2 I  are respectively 
    
2
1 (616 3003 3867 ) / 4418
p cc    , 
2
2 (616 10439 28260 ) / 4418
p cc    ,  12 0
pp
II   .    (13) 
 
Proposition 3: Parallel trade reduces the profit of firm 2 but increases that of firm 1 if 
* 11/50 ( .) c c approx  . 
Proof: We compare the profits of firm 2 under parallel trade and under no parallel trade. 
Specifically, using the expressions in (11) and (13), we have that  11 () / 0
pn pc      for 
[0,12/53] c . Further,  11
pn p     at  12/53 c  , but  11
pn p     at  0 c  . Hence, there exists 
* 11/50 ( .) c approx   such that the profit of firm 1 is higher under parallel trade than under 
no parallel trade if 
* cc  , which proves the result. ■ 
 
Some explanations are in order. Under parallel trade, wholesale prices affect the 
intensity of competition in both countries A and B. A lower wholesale price charged by a 
firm, say firm 1, not only reduces the profits of firm 2 in both countries, it also tends to 
reduce the profit of firm 1 in country A. This negative impact induces the firm to charge a 
relatively higher wholesale price under parallel trade compared with no parallel trade. 
Even if the products of both firms 1 and 2 are being traded in a parallel way, the 
rent extracting effect is stronger for the more cost efficient firm. If firm 1 is very much cost 
efficient than firm 2, parallel trade makes the former firm better off by extracting a 
significant amount of rent from the latter firm. In contrast, if we remove the marginal cost 
difference between the two firms, their rent shifting effects offset each other, and as a 
consequence, the intensity of product market competition will be increased, reducing the 
profits of both firms.   
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3. Unionized labour market in the home country 
In this section we examine the role of unionized labour markets. To isolate its impacts, we 
make some changes to the above analysis by assuming that firm 1 is a monopolist producer 
of the product. This firm has a plant in both country A (the home country) and country B 
(the foreign country), and serves both countries from the respective plants. We assume that 
the labour market in country A is unionized, while that in country B is perfectly 
competitive, and the reservation wage rates in both countries are c, which are assume to be 
zero for simplicity. There is a transportation cost t for trade between the countries. We 
assume that the inverse demand from the consumers’ in country A is  1 A A Pq   while it is 
in country B is  BB Pa q   , with a < 1. This structure is similar to the “partial FDI” case of 
Lommerud et al. (2003), who exclude parallel trade. 
We adopt the right-to-manage
6 model of labour unions,
7 where the labour union 
chooses the wage rate and firm 1, which requires one unit of labour to produce one unit of 
output, determines the employment/output level. We consider full bargaining power of the 
labour union to demonstrate our results in the simplest way.  
 
3.1. No parallel trade 
We analyze the following moves of the game. At stage 1, the labour union sets the wage in 
country A. At stage 2, firm 1 hires labour and produces in countries A and B. Then profits 
are realized. The game is solved by backward induction.  
  Given the wage rates in both countries, firm 1 maximizes: 
                                                           
6 We refer to Vannini and Bughin (2000), Lommerud et al. (2003), López and Naylor (2004), Skaksen (2004) and 
Mukherjee (2007), to name a few, for works on the right-to-manage model of labour unions. 
7 The ‘efficient bargaining’ model, which stipulates that the firms and unions bargain over wages and employment, is an 
alternative to the right-to-manage model. See, Layard et al. (1991) for arguments in favour of right-to-manage models.   
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11
11 1 1 ,
(1 ) (1 )
AB
A AB B qq
Max q w q q q    .                            (14) 
The equilibrium outputs in countries A and B are respectively 
  1 (1 ) / 2 A qw   and 1 /2 B qa  .                          (15) 
Therefore, the labour demand in country A is  (1 ) / 2 Lw   . The labour union 











np w  .                                  (17) 
We assume that 
*,np tw  ,  i.e., 
1/2 t  ,                                  (18) 
which ensures that firm 1 has no incentive to export its product between the countries, 
given that we have assumed away the cost of setting up a business in country B. Even if the 
setup cost is positive but small enough, firm 1 prefers to produce in country B.  











  .                                         (19) 
 
3.2. Parallel trade 
Assume that there is a firm in country 2, called K, who buys the product of firm 1 in 
country B and sells it back to country A. It is assumed that firm 1 does not know the 
identity of the parallel trader as in Hur and Riyanto (2006),
8 and as in the previous 
section the parallel trader derives utility only from profit but not from consumption. 
                                                           
8 If the parallel trader can be identified, firm 1 will not sell the product to the parallel trader if parallel trade makes it 
worse off. Here we show that parallel trade benefits firm 1, and thus it has less incentive to restrict parallel trading even if 
it knows the identity of the parallel trader.   
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Hence, the demand in country B now comes from both consumers and the parallel 
trader. While producing its output in country B, firm 1 needs to internalize this effect. 
  We consider the following game under parallel trade. At stage 1, the labour union 
charges wage in country A. Then at stage 2, firm 1 makes its production decisions in 
countries A and B, and K buys the product of firm 1 in country B and sells it in country A. 
Then the profits are realized. The game is still solved by backward induction.  
 Since  K buys the product in country B, it creates demand in that country along with 
the demand from the consumers. However, the demand by K depends on its sales in 
country  A. Hence, while determining the output in country B, firm 1 should correctly 
anticipate the demand from K and adjust the demand function in country B accordingly. 
  Given the wage rate in country A, the transportation cost t and the price  B P  at 
which K buys the product in country B, K determines its output to maximize: 
  1 (1 )
AK
A AK B AK q
Max q q P t q                      (20) 





AA K A q
Max q q w q   .                         (21) 
















 . Firm 1 anticipates this demand from K. 








 , which firm 1 should correctly anticipate and use in 
determining the output in country B.
 9 
  Therefore, the outputs  AK q ,  1 A q  and  1 B q   are determined by maximizing the 
expressions (20), (21) and the following expression: 
                                                           
9 In contrast to the last section, where the demand from the distributors affects the derived demand for firm 
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 , we obtain the 
equilibrium wage in country B to be 





 .  






























 . It can also be found that the demand by the consumers in country B at 







  . Note that  1 BC AK B qqq   . 






 , which ensures that  0 AK q   and  1 0 B q  . Further, if 
3
(. 0 6 ,  . )
54
a approx  , then our assumption (18) implies that  0 BC q  . Hence, we assume 
in the following analysis that 





 , where the first inequality comes from (18). 
However, the range of t over 








a approx  . We 
restrict our attention to .06 .57 a  . Also 
*,p tw   for .06 .57 a   ,  i.e., firm 1 has no 
incentive to export its product between the countries. 
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Proposition 4: The equilibrium wage in country A is lower and firm 1’s equilibrium output 
is higher in country A under parallel trade than under no parallel trade. 
Proof:  We find that 






 , which holds for 






Firm 1’s output in country A is higher under parallel trade than under no parallel 
trade, i.e., 
22 6 16 1
117 4
at 






 ,  which holds for 





 . ■ 
 
The intuition for the wage reducing effect of parallel trade is as follows. Parallel 
trade increases competition in country A. Hence, ceteris paribus, it reduces the labour 
demand faced by the labour union in the country, which in turn forces the union to reduce 
its wage hike. On the one hand, the increased competition due to parallel trade tends to 
reduce the output of firm 1 in country A; on the other hand, the lowered wage tends to 
increase firm 1’s output. Our result shows that the wage-reducing effect dominates the 
competition effect, and thus increases firm 1’s output in country A.  











  .                      (24) 
 
Proposition 5: The profit of firm 1 is higher under parallel trade than under no parallel 
trade for 





  and .06 .57 a   . 













 . The comparison of (19) and (24) at 
1/2 t   shows that  11
pn p     for .06 .57 a   . ■ 
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The reason for the above result is as follows. Parallel trade intensifies competition in 
country A, though it creates higher demand in country B. For a given wage, the competition 
effect dominates the demand-raising effect, and thus parallel trade tends to reduce firm 1’s 
profit. This is clearly true if the labour markets in both countries are perfectly competitive 
(see Appendix for detailed proof). However, one must take into account another effect. As 
shown in Proposition 4, parallel trade reduces the union wage in country 1, and therefore, 
helps to reduce firm 1’s marginal cost of production in country A. The beneficial wage-
reducing effect (along with the demand-raising effect) outweighs the negative competition 
effect and hence increases firm 1’s profit under parallel trade. That is, in the presence of a 
labour union, parallel trade may benefit a manufacturer by reducing the unionized wage. 
  To show the role of unions in the simplest way, we have given the labour union full 
bargaining power. The other extreme case is full bargaining power of the manufacturer. In 
this situation, the equilibrium wage is equal to the reservation wage of the worker. The 
analysis under this situation is similar to that shown in the Appendix. Hence, it is clear that 
the presence of a labour union may make a manufacturer better off under parallel trade if 
the bargaining power of the labour union is not very low. 
The market demand function in country A, from which the labour demand is 
derived, plays an important role in determining the beneficial effects of parallel trade. We 
may conjecture the case of a different demand situation. For example, as the elasticity of 
the market demand function in country A increases, it will have a lower adverse impact on 
firm 1’s production and labour demand in that country following parallel trade, since a 
relatively smaller reduction in the price of the final goods is required to accommodate the 
output of the parallel trader. Hence, as the elasticity of the market demand function 
increases, firm 1 needs to reduce its output by a lower amount following parallel trade. In 
other words, both the adverse competition effect and the favourable wage-reducing effect  
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fall with a more elastic market demand function. However, the demand-raising effect in 
country B remains, thus increasing the possibility of a beneficial parallel trade.   
 
4. Conclusion 
It is generally believed that parallel trade reduces profits of the manufacturers. However, 
empirical evidences do not always support this view. In this paper, we identify two new 
factors under parallel trade, viz., market stealing and union-wage cutting, which may be 
responsible for generating higher profits to some manufacturers. Market stealing arises in 
situations when the manufacturer is even slightly more efficient or sells in more markets 
than its competitors. In these situations, the manufacturer can strategically take advantage 
of parallel trading in its competition with rivals. Similarly, it can also use this advantage in 
an imperfect factor market, such as when labour is unionized. As long as the union has 
some bargaining power for wage hikes, parallel trading can help the manufacturer to 
weaken the wage demand. For these reasons, many manufacturers often accept parallel 





Parallel trade makes the manufacturer worse off without a union 
Consider the set up of Section 3 with the exception that the labour markets are perfectly 
competitive in both countries. For simplicity, assume that the reservation wage is zero in 
both countries. If there is no parallel trade, standard calculations show that the total profit 









  The equilibrium values under parallel trade follows immediately from Section 3 




































 . The boundary conditions are as follows:  AK q  and 
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The total profit of firm 1 under parallel trade is 
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a  , and 










a   . 
  Standard calculation shows that  11
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